Consumer Protection Act, 1986
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A corporate Auditor has a statutory standard form of
contract. If he fails to perform his contractual obligation he is liable to his
employer, i.e. the company. Contractual liability arises also on account of lack
of proper care and due diligence. Of course a corporate auditor in such cases is
liable under the statute itself.
The question of auditor’s liability for negligence has been
tried more in the English courts rather than in India. In a suit for negligence
it would be up to the plaintiff to prove that the professional had some duty to
him and a breach of such duty has resulted in an injury.
Some of the cases wherein this Principle has been enumerated
is in one of the earliest decision on auditor’s liability was given in In Re
London and General Bank [(1895) 2 ch 673 (No.2)]. In this case Lord Justice
Lindley said "An auditor however is not bound to do more than exercising
reasonable care and skill in making enquires and investigations. What is
reasonable care in any particular case must depend on the circumstances of that
case". This decision became the precedent in several other subsequent cases.
In the case of In Re Kingston Cotton Mill Co. [(1896) 2 ch
279 (No 2) Lord Justice Lindley stated that the auditors should not be
suspicious but only be reasonably careful. Lord Justice Lopes, in the same case
stated "In determining whether any misfeasance or breach of duty has been
committed, it is essential to consider what the duties of an auditor are? An
auditor is not bound to be detective or, as was said, to approach his work with
suspicion or with a foregone conclusion that there is something wrong. He is
watch dog not a blood hound. He is justified in believing true servants of the
company in whom confidence is placed by the company. Auditors must not be made
liable for not tracing out ingenious and carefully laid schemes of fraud when
there is nothing to arouse their suspicion.
However the legal standards of reasonable care have been
critically examined in recent times more particularly in the decision of the
House of Lords in Fomento Sterling Area Ltd., V. Selsdon Fountain Pen Co. ltd
[(1958) 1 WLR 45]. Lord Dening said "the vital task of an auditor is to take
care to see that errors are not made, be they errors of computation, or errors
of omission or commission or down right untruth. I would not have it thought
that the Kingston Mill’s Case relieved an auditor of his responsibility of
making a proper check. It is part of his duty to use reasonable care to see that
none have been omitted which ought to be included.
Auditor’s Liability
Civil Liability: Auditor has civil liability for
misfeasance. Several sections of the Companies Act attach such liability on
the Auditor. For example, sections. 57, 58, 59, 62(3), 62(4), 70(50), 233,
477, 488, 543, 545, 621, 625, 633 provide civil liability on an Auditor.
Criminal Liability: Under Sec 197 of the Indian Penal code,
whosoever issues or signs any certificate required by law to be given or
signed or relating to any fact which such certificate by law is admissible by
evidence, knowing or believing that such certificate is false in any material
point shall be punishable in the same manner as if he gives a false evidence.
Example: Sec 233 of Companies Act gives PENALTY FOR
NON-COMPLIANCE BY AUDITOR WITH SECTIONS 227 AND 229
If any auditor’s report is made, or any document of the
company is signed or authenticated, otherwise than in conformity with the
requirements of section 227 and 229, the auditor concerned, and the person, if
any, other than the auditor who signs the report or signs or authenticates the
document, shall, if the default is wilful, be punishable with fine which may
extend to [ 1118 ten thousand rupees. 1118 ]
Liability to third parties
The annual account of a company as certified by the Auditor
is the standard disclosure required from the company under the corporate law.
As such investors, creditors, bankers, tax authorities and all other parties
having any relation with the company take a decision in the basis of Auditor’s
certificate. An author takes the analogy of a physician’s relation with the
clients with the Auditor’s position in so far as relation between him and
third parties are concerned based on his certificate.
The physician in primarily responsible to his client and
secondarily to other members of the family for the injury from the negligence
of his duty of care and issue of certificate. Auditor’s position is perhaps
more intricate than a physician. It is for this reason that the issue gets its
importance in such litigation in several countries.
The age old principle in law of tort as enunciated in 1893
in Le livre & Dennes V. Gould[(1922) IK.B. 688] is that the " question of
liability for negligence cannot arise at all until it is established that the
man who has been negligent owe some duty to the person who seeks to make him
liable for his negligence". In 1889 it was held in Derry V. Peek[(1889)14
App.Cas 337] that to make an Auditor liable to third parties the following
four grounds must be satisfied:
A) the statement made by the Auditor was untrue in fact;
B) the Auditor making it, knew that it is untrue or he
was negligent to find out the truth;
C) the statement was made with an intent that the
identified third party should act on it with sound belief; and
D) the identified third party suffered loss by placing
reliance on it.
In India the issue came before the court in CIT v. GM
Dandekar [(1952) 22 Comp.Cas 256] where the issue was brought by the
Income Tax officer holding the Auditor for negligence and therefore liable to
compensate. The court held that the Auditor did not owe a duty to care to
third parties.
The reason why professionals are held responsible for the
deficiency in service is due to Professional Ethics. Every profession builds
up a code of professional conduct which its members undertake to observe. The
code of professional conduct is based upon the principle of morality and
ethics. It distinguishes the professional men from others and ensures public
confidence. Though the law does not prescribe a clear code of conduct for the
auditors, the corporate auditors are covered by the code of conduct legislated
by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India. Similarly the code of
conduct has been negatively identified as professional misconduct. The
definition of professional misconduct is given in sec. 22 of the Chartered
Accountants Act 1949.
UNDER CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 1986
(g) "deficiency" means any fault, imperfection, shortcoming
or inadequacy in the quality, nature and manner of performance which is
required to be maintained by or under any law for the time being in force or
has been undertaken to be performed by a person in pursuance of a contract or
otherwise in relation to any service;
(o) "service" means service of any description which is
made available to potential [users and includes, but not limited to, the
provision of] facilities in connection with banking, financing insurance,
transport, processing, supply of electrical or other energy, board or lodging
or both, [housing construction,] entertainment, amusement or the purveying of
news or other information, but does not include the rendering of any service
free of charge or under a contract of personal service;
While the Companies Act recognises the responsibility of
the Auditor, there is no express provision under the Consumer Protection Act
to hold a Chartered Accountant guilty of deficiency in service. Deficiency in
Service of a professional has come to be interpreted in a vast sense through
the following judgements, wherein the services provided by a professional has
come to be included under the purview of the Consumer Protection Act.:-
Earlier view taken by the Courts in 2005-(CT3)-GJX -0382
–SC, Jacob Mathew V. State Of Punjab And Another.
20. In the law of negligence, professionals such as
lawyers, doctors, accountants, engineers and architects and others are
included in the category of persons professing some special skill or skilled
persons generally. Any task which is required to be performed with a special
skill would generally be admitted or undertaken to be performed only if the
person possesses the requisite skill for performing that task. Any reasonable
man entering into a profession which requires a particular level of learning
to be called a professional of that branch, impliedly assures the person
dealing with him that the skill which he professes to possess shall be
exercised and exercised with reasonable degree of care and caution. He does
not assure his client of the result. A lawyer does not tell his client that
the client shall win the case in all circumstances. A physician would not
assure the patient of full recovery in every case. A surgeon cannot and does
not guarantee that the result of surgery would invariably be beneficial, much
less to the extent of 100% for the person operated on. The only assurance
which such a professional can give or can be understood to have given by
implication is that he is possessed of the requisite skill in that branch of
profession which he is practising and while undertaking the performance of the
task entrusted to him he would be exercising his skill with reasonable
competence. This is all what the person approaching the professional can
expect. Judged by this standard, a professional may be held liable for
negligence on one of two findings: either he was not possessed of the
requisite skill which he professed to have possessed, or, he did not exercise,
with reasonable competence in the given case, the skill which he did possess.
The standard to be applied for judging, whether the person charged has been
negligent or not, would be that of an ordinary competent person exercising
ordinary skill in that profession. It is not necessary for every professional
to possess the highest level of expertise in that branch which he practices.
In Michael Hyde and Associates v. J.D. Williams & Co. Ltd., [2001] P.N.L.R.
233, CA, Sedley L.J. said that where a profession embraces a range of
views as to what is an acceptable standard of conduct, the competence of the
defendant is to be judged by the lowest standard that would be regarded as
acceptable. (Charlesworth & Percy, ibid, Para 8.03)
2. 1992-(CT2)-GJX -0011 –NCDRC
Cosmopolitan Hospitals & Anr. V. Smt. Vasantha P. Nair.
Cosmopolitan Hospitals & Anr. V. Smt. V.P. Santha And Ors.
9. Dealing with the objection raised that the service
rendered by the opposite parties was "personal service", the opposite parties
was "personal service", the State Commission held that like the service of a
lawyer, the service rendered by the hospital and its doctors was basically
professional service and hence "it will be incorrect, infelicitous and even
crude" to call the sophisticated high class professional service as ‘personal
service’.
13. Learned Counsel appearing for the appellants as well as
for the interveners reiterated before us the contentions which had been urged
before the State Commission on behalf of the opposite parties in the two
complaint petitions. Reference was made by them to the statement of objects
and reasons of the Consumer Protection Bill, 1986 and it was contended that
when the objects and reasons set out therein are read alongwith the speech
made in Parliament by the then Hon’ble Minister of Parliamentary Affairs and
Food and Civil Supplies while introducing the Bill in Parliament, it would be
clear that the only purpose sought to be achieved by the various provisions
contained in the Bill was to safeguard and protect the interests of consumers
against unscrupulous traders selling defective goods or indulging in unfair
trade practices and against deficiency in services stating to "commercial
transactions" alone. On this basis it was contended that the services rendered
to a patient by a medical practitioner which is a professional service has
absolutely no connection with the definition of the expression ‘service’
contained in Section 2(1)(o) of the Act. According to the appellants and
interveners, the expression ‘service’ in the Act relates only to goods
purchased by a consumer. It was further submitted that the legislation that
governs the medical practitioners is only the Medical Council Act, 1956 and it
is only this law, which has been left unamended by the Consumer Protection
Act, that governs the field as far as the professional services of the medical
practitioners and those rendered in hospitals are concerned. It was urged by
the Counsel for the appellants and the interveners, the expressions
‘consumer’, ‘service’, ‘hires any service’, ‘consumer dispute’, ‘defect’ and
‘deficiency’ have to be understood in a commercial sense only. They submitted
that the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 has no application to the medical
profession at all or to the services rendered in hospitals whether they are
run by Government or by private agencies; and that it is wholly incorrect to
say that a patient treated by a doctor in a hospital is a "consumer" coming
within the definition of the Act.
10. In Oxford Companion to Law (Page 1134) contract for
services has been defined as follows:
"In Roman Law Locatio operis faciendi, the contract whereby
one party undertakes to render services e.g. professional or technical
services, to or for another in the performance of which he is not subject to
detailed direction and control but exercises professional or technical skill
and uses his own knowledge and discretion. There are two major groups of such
services, professional services of lawyers, accountants, surgeons and the like
and technical services of building and engineering contractors, builders,
garages and many more."
In Strouds Judicial Dictionary (Page 540, 5th Edn.) it is
mentioned: "A contract to render services is not the same as a ‘contract of
service’; semble, the latter implies some relationship of master and servant
and involves an obligation to obey orders in the work to be performed and as
to its mode and manner of performance."
We may also quoted here the following passage occurring at
page 268 of the report of the case of Dharangadhra Chemicals Works Ltd.
(supra):
"The principle which emerges from these authorities is that
the prima facie test for the determination of the relationship between master
and servant is the existence of the right in master to supervise and control
the work done by the servant not only in the matter of directing what work the
servant is to do but also the manner in which he shall do his work."
It was further remarked in the above case (page 268 of the
report):
The correct method of approach, therefore, would be to
consider whether having regard to the nature of the work there was due control
and supervision by the employer or to use the words of Fletcher Moulton, L.J.,
page 549 in Simmons v. Health Laundry Company, (1910) 1 KB 543 at pp. 549,
550 :
"In my opinion it is impossible to lay down any rule of law
distinguishing the one from the other. It is a question of fact to be decided
by all the circumstances of the case. The greater amount of direct control
exercised over the person rendering the services by the person contracting for
them the stronger the grounds for holding it to be a contract of service, and
similarly the greater the degree of independence of such control the greater
the probability that the services rendered are of the nature of professional
services and that the contract is not one of service."
The following passage from the judgment in Executive
Committee of Vaish Degree College v. Laxmi Narain and Ors. (AIR 1976 SC 888
at p. 902) will also be useful for further discussions in the case:
"It must be noted that all these doctrines of contract of
service as personal, non assignable, unenforceable and so on grew in an age
when contract of service was still frequently a ‘personal relation’ between
the owner of a small workshop or trade or business and his servant.
Of course in a narrow sense there is personal element in
practically all services such as a servant’s or aya’s service. However, it
will be incorrect and even crude to call the professional or technical service
as personal service.
PRESENT VIEW OF THE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION
The present view of including Advocates and other
professionals has come to be incorporated after a series of judgements, one of
which is as under.
3 1996-(CT2)-GJX-0075-MAD
Srimathi And Others V. Union of India And Others.
Writ Petition Nos. 21557 & 21560 of 1994 & Writ Petition
Nos. 2109, 2110 & 4233 of 1995 decided on March 6, 1996.
In these writ petitions, a common question is raised
regarding the constitutional validity of Section 3 of the Consumer Protection
Act, 1986. The prayer in all the writ petitions is for a declaration that
Section 3 of the said Act is unconstitutional, being opposed to the object of
the Act. The petitioners in these cases are practising advocates. Claims have
been made against them by certain persons who are impleaded as respondents in
the respective cases before the Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum. In some
cases it is before the District Forum and in some cases it is before the State
Forum.
2. The contention of the petitioners is that advocates are
governed by the Advocates Act and they shall not be made to answer the claims
under the Consumer Protection Act. It is contended that the objects of the Act
do not contain any provision which will bring in the services rendered by an
advocate to his client within the scope of the Consumer Protection Act. It is
also argued that the definition of ‘consumer’ will not include a client, who
was availed of the services of an advocate. It is further contended that an
advocate should not be made liable to face claims under different statutes.
According to the petitioners, an advocate in a particular case, can be made to
defend a proceeding (1) under the Advocates Act before the Bar Council, (2)
under the Criminal Law before the Criminal Courts, (3) before Civil Court
under the Civil Law, and (4) before the Consumer Redressal Forum under the
Consumer Protection Act. It is argued that when there is a special enactment
governing the advocates, viz., Advocates Act, he shall not be made to face
claims under the different Acts, referred to above. In particular, it is
stated that the provision contained in Section 3 of the Consumer Protection
Act, by which, the provisions of the said Act are declared to be in addition
to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being
runs counter to the objects of the Act. According to the petitioner, if that
Section is struck down as unconstitutional, it will not be possible for any
person to drag the advocate before the Consumer Redressal Forum as the claim
will be outside the scope of the said Act. It is also submitted that in a
proceeding before the Consumer Redressal Forum, no Court-fee is payable and it
may be possible for any person to file a frivolous action against the advocate
in that Forum and even if that person fails ultimately, and if the advocate
wants to make a claim for damages, it cannot be made without payment of
Court-fee by the advocate in a Civil Court. Such provisions cause undue
hardship and place and advocate in a hazardous situation thereby making his
profession worthless.
We are unable to appreciate the second limb of the
arguments that, if the section is struck down as unconstitutional, no person
can institute any proceeding before Consumer Redressal Forum against an
advocate. Even if the section is declared to be unconstitutional the other
sections of the Act will continue to be intact and if the services of the
advocate fall within the definition of service under Section 2(o) of the Act,
then, it will be certainly open to a client to proceed against the advocate
before the Consumer Redressal Forum. Hence, the object of the petitioners in
these writ petitions to exclude the advocates from the purview of the Consumer
Redressal Forum cannot be achieved by the grant of the prayer made in these
writ petitions. We are at a loss to understand the reason for the petitioners
making such a prayer in these petitions.
7. The ruling cannot help the petitioners herein as it is a
question of interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Act. It is seen
that there is a specific section in the Railway Claims Tribunal Act barring
the jurisdiction of other Courts and authorities. But, there is no such
provision in the Advocates Act to bar the jurisdiction of other Courts and
authorities or Tribunals in relation to matters connected with the advocates
or disputes arising between the clients and their advocates. Section 6 of the
Advocates Act sets out the functions of State Bar Council. There is no
provision in the Advocates Act to enable the Bar Council to deal with the
dispute between the client and the advocate if the clients seeks to remedy of
damages or refund of money paid to the advocates or sums on monetary claim.
The Bar Council can deal with only disciplinary matters and consider whether
the advocate is guilty of misconduct which will fall under Section 6(1) of the
Advocates Act. Hence, there is no substance in the contention that the
Advocates Act will prevail over the Consumer Protection Act and Consumer
Redressal Forum will have no jurisdiction to deal with claims against the
advocates.
9. Learned counsel for the petitioners referred to Section
2(d) of the Act wherein ‘consumer’ is defined. According to him, the
definition of Consumer will not take in a client who engaged the advocate for
professional services. We cannot accept this contention. The language in
Clause 2 of Section 2(d) of the Act is very wide. It uses the expression
"avails of any service for a consideration." That will not certainly exclude
the services rendered by advocate. Further, the matter is made clear by the
definition of "service" in Section 2(d) of the Act. The section read as
follows:
"Service" means service of any description which is made
available to potential users and includes the provision of facilities in
connection with banking, financing, insurance, transport, processing, supply
of electrical or other energy, boarding or lodging or both, (housing
construction), entertainment, amusement or the purveying of news or other
information, but does not include the rendering of any service free of charge
or under a contract of persona service."
10. It is not necessary for us to labour much on this
aspect of the matter in view of the fact that the Supreme Court has recently
considered the definition of "service" in two cases. First of that is in
Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta, (1993) 1 CTJ 929 (Supreme Court)
(CP) = (1994 (I) MLJ (SC) 55). Referring to the word "service"" the Court
said:
"The term has variety of meanings. It may mean any benefit
or any act resulting in promoting interest or happiness. It may be
contractual, professional, public, domestic, legal, statutory etc. The concept
of service thus is very wide."
11. Referring to the definition in Section 2(o) of the Act,
the Court said:
"It is in three parts. The main part is followed by
inclusive clause and ends by exclusionary clause. The main clause itself is
very wide. It applies to any service made available to potential users. The
words ‘any’ and ‘potential’ are significant. Both are of wide amplitude. The
word ‘any’ dictionarily means ‘one or some or all’. In Black’s Law Dictionary
it is explained thus, "word ‘any’ has a diversity of meaning and may be
employed to indicate ‘all’ or ‘every’ as well as ‘some’ or ‘one’ and its
meaning in a given statute depends upon the context and the subject-matter of
the statute. The use of the word ‘any’ in the context it has been used in
clause (d) indicates from one to all."
12. When the question was raised whether the medical
profession will be covered by the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act,
the Supreme Court answered the same in the affirmative. While doing so, the
Supreme Court reversed the judgment of this Court. In Indian Medical
Association v. V.P. Shantha, (1994) 2 CTJ 969 (Supreme Court) (CP) =
(1995(6) SC 651) the Supreme Court has held that the applicability of the
Consumer Protection Act cannot be questioned on the ground that the medical
practitioners are subject of disciplinary control under Medical Council Act,
1956. The contention similar to the one, put forward before us, was urged
before the Supreme Court and negatived. It is useful to refer to the following
passages in the judgment of the Supreme Court which are relevant for the
purpose of this case:
"It has been urged that medical practitioners are governed
by the provisions of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 and the code of
Medical Ethics made by the Medical Council of India, as approved by the
Government of India under Section 3 of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956
which regulates their conduct as members of the medical profession and
provides for disciplinary action by the Medical Council of India and/or State
Medical Council against a person for professional misconduct."
(i) the nature of the work which is skilled and
specialised and a substantial part is mental rather than manual;
(ii) commitment to moral principles which go beyond the
general duty of honesty and a wider duty to community which may transcend
the duty to a particular client or patient;
(iii) Professional association which regulates admission
and seeks to uphold the standards of the profession through professional
codes on matters of conduct and ethics; and
(iv) high status in the community.
The learned authors have stated that during the twentieth
century, an increasing number of occupations have been seeking and achieving
‘professional’ status and that this has led inevitably to some blurring of the
features which traditionally distinguish the professions from other
occupations. In the context of the law relating to ‘Professional’ Negligence,
the learned authors have accorded professional status to seven specific
occupations, namely, (i) architects, engineers and quantity surveyors, (ii)
surveyors, (iii) accountants, (iv) solicitors, (v) barristers, (vi) medical
practitioners, and (vii) insurance brokers. (Jackson & Powell on Professional
Negligence, paras 1.01 and 1.03, 3rd Edn.")
We are, therefore, unable to subscribe to the view that
merely because medical practitioners belong to the medical profession they are
outside the purview of the provisions of the Act and the services rendered by
medical practitioners are not covered by Section 2(1)(o) of the Act.
It cannot, therefore, be said that since the members of the
Consumer Disputes Redressal Agencies are not required to have knowledge and
experience in medicine, they are not in a position to deal with issues which
may arise before them in proceedings arising out of complaints about the
deficiency in service rendered by medical practitioners."
In complaints involving complicated issues requiring,
recording of evidence of experts, the complainant can be asked to approach the
Civil Court for appropriate relief. Section 3 of the Act which prescribes that
the provisions of the Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the
provisions of any other law for the time being in force, preserves the right
of the consumer to approach the Civil Court for necessary relief. We are,
therefore, unable to hold that on the ground of composition of the Consumer
Disputes Redressal Agencies or on the ground of the procedure which is
followed by the said Agencies for determining the issues arising before them,
the service rendered by the medical practitioners are not intended to be
included in the expression ‘service’ as defined in Section 2(1)(o) of the
Act."
13. The above decision of the Supreme Court is a complete
answer to the question raised by the petitioners in these matters. It is not
necessary for us to add anything thereto in order to reject the contentions of
the petitioners. It may also be pointed out that the validity of several
provisions of the Act has been upheld by a Division Bench of this Court in the
Registrar, University of Madras v. The Union of India (1995) 3 CTJ 100
(Madras High Court) (CP) = (1995) 2 MLJ 367) to which one of us (Srinivasan,
J.) was a party. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the Act
has been struck down as unconstitutional by the Calcutta High Court relying on
a news paper report. But, it is seen from the subsequent reports in the
newspapers that the said judgment has been appealed against and the appellate
Bench has granted stay of operation of the order by which the single Judge
struck down the provisions of the Act. But, it is unnecessary for us to take
note of the same in view of the fact that a Division Bench of this Court has
upheld the validity of the provisions of the Act. We are not bound by the
judgment of the Calcutta High Court.
14. In the result, all the contentions urged by the
petitioners are negatived and the writ petitions are dismissed. No costs. It
is needless to point out that it is open to the Advocates, in all these
petitions against whom proceedings have taken before the Consumer Redressal
Forum, to raise all defenses available to them in law excepting the question
that the Advocates are not covered by the provisions of the Consumer Redressal
Act.
The Amendment in 2002 has changed the definition of Service
under Sec. 2 (1)(o) completely. The new definition is not inclusive or
exhaustive. The Amendment has added the words "but not limited to", which
leaves the definition open for interpretation according to the circumstances
of the particular case.
From the above interpretations of the Apex court, it is
clear that the:
1. Professional Service is covered under the Consumer
Protection Act, 1896
2. Professional Service is not Personal Service, hence it
is not covered under the exception.
3. According to Sec. 3, the provision of this Act shall
be in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law
for the time being in force.
Hence all Professionals can be held liable under
the Consumer Protection Act. But the point that has to be looked at is if
there has been any deficiency in service. An auditor’s deficiency in service
is very difficult to be established. Moreover, he would be held liable for
deficiency even to third parties if interpreted. Considering the fact that
Advocates are now made liable for the deficiency in service meted out to
clients, it is now established that Professional Service would be covered
under the purview of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.
Taking a very divergent view from the earlier
philosophy the Hon’ble Supreme Court is seized with a new line of argument,
wherein the concept of the Advocate being an officer of the Court, is actually
assisting the Court to do proper justice and hence he is not rendering service
to the litigant for a consideration but to the Court of law and hence an
Advocate would not come within the net of the Consumer Protection Act.
While the principle that the special law would
override the general law, is being thrown to the winds by the Consumer Fora,
which in one law is trying to bring under it’s preview the Co-operative
Societies Laws, the Banking laws as well even the payment of wages and
gratuity laws, on the other hand the Consumer Fora are trying to find an
escape hole into wherever the situation demands, due to which there is no
discipline being introduced in the system. Such a trend is disastrous to
attain stability to a system where the whims and fancies of individuals who
sit in the seat of this semi-judicial system of dispensing speedy justice
under summary proceedings. How unfortunate it would be for any nation to have
the justice delivery system in the hands of persons who are human beings and
thus vulnerable to moods, personal preferences, prejudice and personal
opinions.
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